One Health Approach to Emerging Zoonoses: Integrating Veterinary and Human Health Data

By Dr. Zubair Khalid, DVM, MS, PhD · 2026-08-11

Key Takeaways

• Over 60% of human infectious diseases are zoonotic, with endemic and enzootic zoonoses causing approximately one billion human illnesses and millions of deaths annually, underscoring the critical need for integrated veterinary and human health surveillance.
• Emerging zoonotic diseases are primarily driven by anthropogenic environmental changes such as habitat disruption, species translocation, and agricultural intensification, which alter pathogen ecological niches and host-pathogen contact dynamics.
• Domestic animals, particularly companion animals like dogs, serve as valuable sentinels for emerging zoonoses due to their shared environments with humans and parallel disease spectrums, enabling early detection of novel presentations or increased pathogen circulation.
• Integrated surveillance relies on standardized data capture across sectors, including structured clinical records with detailed exposure histories and consistent diagnostic criteria, to enable effective signal detection and coordinated response to zoonotic threats.
• Tick-borne diseases exemplify the value of integrated surveillance, with rapid discovery of new agents and geographic expansion necessitating the combination of human case reporting, tick collection data, and animal seroprevalence studies to map pathogen distribution and identify emerging risks.
• Failure modes in integrated surveillance include data fragmentation across separate platforms, signal dilution due to lack of prioritization, and sentinel blind spots where animal infections do not directly correlate with human disease severity, requiring robust cross-sectoral audits and risk-based prioritization.

The integration of veterinary and human health surveillance data is a central operational requirement for detecting and responding to emerging zoonotic threats. More than 60% of human infectious diseases are caused by pathogens shared with wild or domestic animals, and endemic and enzootic zoonoses cause approximately one billion cases of illness in people and millions of deaths annually, according to the review of zoonotic disease ecology by Karesh and colleagues. This article examines the conceptual foundations, data integration frameworks, and practical surveillance architectures that support a One Health approach to emerging zoonoses. It is written for veterinary researchers and clinicians engaged in population health, diagnostic investigation, or cross-sectoral disease control.

The central question addressed here is how veterinary data can be structured, shared, and interpreted alongside human health data to shorten the interval between pathogen emergence and effective intervention. The article covers the ecological drivers of emergence, the design logic of integrated surveillance systems, the role of domestic animals as sentinels, and the institutional frameworks that govern data sharing. Later sections in this four-part series address specific integration challenges, comparative clinical manifestations, and foodborne transmission pathways.

At a Glance

Ecological Drivers of Zoonotic Emergence

Zoonotic pathogens occupy ecological niches defined by host range, transmission route, and environmental persistence. Emergence occurs when anthropogenic change alters one or more of these parameters. Daszak and colleagues demonstrated that emerging infectious diseases in wildlife are driven predominantly by ecological factors that are almost entirely products of human environmental change. Amphibian chytridiomycosis, marine invertebrate diseases, Nipah virus, and West Nile virus each exemplify how habitat disruption, species translocation, or agricultural intensification creates novel host-pathogen contact.

Agricultural intensification deserves particular attention as a mechanistic driver. The analysis of the first Nipah virus outbreak in Malaysia and Singapore by Pulliam and colleagues refuted the earlier hypothesis that El Niño Southern Oscillation-related climatic conditions triggered emergence. Instead, repeated viral introduction from flying foxes into a commercial pig farm changed infection dynamics within the herd. The initial introduction produced an explosive epizootic that self-extinguished but primed the population for enzootic persistence upon reintroduction. This within-farm persistence permitted regional spread and increased human infections. The concept of priming for persistence provides a testable mechanism for other livestock-associated emergence events and argues for surveillance designs that detect repeated introductions instead of single spillover events.

Host Range and Reservoir Dynamics

Reservoir hosts maintain pathogens without clinical disease and provide the source population for spillover. The distinction between reservoir and accidental host determines surveillance strategy. Chomel and colleagues note that cats are the main reservoir for Bartonella henselae, B. clarridgeiae, and B. koehlerae, whereas dogs are more likely accidental hosts for most Bartonella species in nontropical regions. This distinction matters operationally: reservoir-focused surveillance targets prevalence and transmission dynamics, while sentinel surveillance in accidental hosts detects environmental risk and human exposure potential.

Principles of Integrated Surveillance

Integrated surveillance links data streams across species to detect anomalies that would be invisible within a single sector. The design logic rests on three premises. First, animal infections often precede human infections because domestic animals amplify pathogens or serve as bridge hosts. Second, veterinary diagnostic data can provide early warning when clinical presentations in animals are recognized as unusual. Third, combined data increase statistical power to detect spatial or temporal clusters that individual sectors lack the sample size to identify.

The WHO One Health initiative frames this integration as a requirement for zoonotic disease control and antimicrobial resistance management. The CDC One Health and zoonotic disease resources provide practical guidance on zoonotic disease prioritization and cross-sector collaboration. Both frameworks emphasize that data integration must occur at the point of collection design, not as a retrospective exercise.

Sentinel Surveillance in Companion Animals

Companion animals occupy a unique position in integrated surveillance because they share household environments with humans and receive regular veterinary care. Chomel and colleagues describe dogs as excellent sentinels for human Bartonella infections because a similar disease spectrum develops in dogs. This parallel disease expression allows veterinary clinicians to identify emerging presentations that may precede or accompany human cases. The practical implication is that veterinary diagnostic laboratories should report unusual clinical presentations or diagnostic findings through structured channels that feed into human health surveillance systems.

Vector-Borne Disease Surveillance

Tick-borne diseases illustrate the value of integrated surveillance for pathogens with complex transmission cycles. Eisen and colleagues document that 40% of the 15 major tick-borne disease agents transmitted by the eight most commonly human-biting ixodid ticks in the United States were described within the last two decades. Animal studies are essential for understanding how these pathogens are maintained in nature, and molecular detection advances have driven the discovery of new agents. Veterinary data on tick exposure, seroprevalence, and clinical disease in domestic animals can map pathogen distribution more densely than human case reporting alone, because animals are exposed earlier and more frequently in peridomestic environments.

Data Sharing Architecture

Effective integration requires agreed data standards, defined case definitions across species, and governance structures that address confidentiality and data ownership. The WOAH terrestrial animal health code provides international standards for animal health surveillance and trade-related disease reporting. Veterinary researchers should align local surveillance protocols with these standards to ensure interoperability with human health data systems.

The MSD Veterinary Manual and AVMA practice resources offer species-specific clinical reference material and professional guidance that support consistent diagnostic approaches across practices. Standardized diagnostic criteria reduce the noise that undermines cross-sector data comparison.

Institutional Frameworks and Governance

The operational gap between veterinary and human health sectors is often institutional instead of technical. The WHO One Health initiative and the CDC One Health and zoonotic disease resources both emphasize that successful integration requires formal agreements, joint training, and shared funding mechanisms. Veterinary researchers engaged in emerging zoonosis work should identify the relevant national and international bodies for their jurisdiction and establish reporting relationships before an outbreak occurs.

Diagnostic Workup and Risk Stratification in Suspected Zoonotic Exposure

The clinical approach to a suspected zoonotic event begins with a structured exposure history. For companion animal cases, the sequence includes signalment, vaccination status, ectoparasite control history, outdoor access, dietary habits including raw feeding, and recent travel or boarding. For production animals, the history expands to include herd-level morbidity patterns, recent animal introductions, wildlife contact, water sources, and biosecurity protocols. The same exposure questions apply in reverse when a veterinary team learns of human illness in an owner or handler, because pets serve as a substantial reservoir for human infection with agents such as Bartonella spp., where cats are the primary reservoir for B. henselae, B. clarridgeiae, and B. koehlerae Chomel et al. on zoonotic Bartonella in pets.

Risk stratification determines the pace and breadth of the diagnostic workup. A febrile cat with a bite wound and no flea control carries different pretest probability for B. henselae than a febrile indoor-only cat on year-round isoxazoline therapy. The decision to pursue molecular testing, serology, or culture should follow from that stratification instead of from a standard panel applied to every case. Serology has limited utility in acutely ill animals because antibodies appear late and prior exposure is common in endemic regions. PCR on whole blood, sterile site aspirates, or affected tissue is preferred for acute diagnosis when Bartonella is suspected, though intermittent bacteremia means a negative result does not exclude infection Chomel et al. on zoonotic Bartonella in pets.

For vector-borne disease suspects, the diagnostic sequence should incorporate the regional tick and pathogen ecology. In the United States, ticks transmit the greatest diversity of arthropod-borne pathogens, and 40% of the 15 major tick-borne disease agents were described within the last two decades Eisen et al. on tick-borne zoonoses in the United States. This rapid discovery rate means that reference laboratory panels are continually expanding, and a negative result on an older panel may simply reflect the absence of newer targets. Clinicians should confirm that the laboratory panel includes locally relevant agents and should interpret negative results in the context of the animal's clinical syndrome, not as definitive exclusion of tick-borne disease.

Decision Points That Change the Diagnostic Approach

The monitoring parameters differ by syndrome. For suspected hemotropic or vector-borne disease, serial packed cell volume, platelet count, and serum biochemistry track disease progression and treatment response. For neurological presentations compatible with viral encephalitis, the monitoring focus shifts to mentation, seizure activity, and respiratory function, because some zoonotic viruses carry human-to-human transmission potential and require immediate public health notification WHO One Health framework. In production animal outbreaks, the monitoring unit is the cohort, not the individual, and the parameters include abortion rate, feed conversion, and mortality within a defined period.

Data Integration for Outbreak Detection

The practical core of One Health surveillance is the systematic comparison of animal and human health data streams to detect anomalies before they reach epidemic scale. Veterinary diagnostic laboratory submissions, syndromic surveillance from companion animal practices, livestock mortality reports, and wildlife rehabilitation admissions all generate data that can be integrated with human emergency department presentations and notifiable disease reports. The integration framework has three operational layers: data capture, signal detection, and coordinated response.

Data capture requires standardized case definitions across sectors. A human case of encephalitis and a porcine case of respiratory disease with neurological signs may share an aetiology, but they will not be linked unless both are recorded with comparable metadata on location, time, and exposure. The Nipah virus emergence in Malaysia illustrates this point: repeated introduction of the virus from flying foxes into commercial pig farms changed infection dynamics within the herd, priming the population for enzootic persistence and enabling regional spread that increased human infections Pulliam et al. on agricultural intensification and Nipah virus emergence. Retrospective analysis showed that livestock production data from the index farm contained the signals of this process, but those data were not integrated with human surveillance until after the outbreak was recognized.

Signal detection methods range from simple threshold alerts to statistical process control. A practical approach for veterinary practices is the calculation of weekly syndrome frequencies, such as cases of febrile illness with thrombocytopenia or acute neurological presentations, compared against a rolling 12-month baseline. When the observed frequency exceeds two standard deviations above the baseline, the practice flags the cluster to the relevant public health or animal health authority. This method detects unusual clusters without requiring a specific aetiological diagnosis at the point of care.

Documentation Standards That Enable Integration

Clinical records should include structured fields for exposure history, not free-text notes. The minimum dataset for a zoonotic suspect includes species, breed, age, vaccination status, ectoparasite control product and last administration date, outdoor access, contact with wildlife, raw meat consumption, travel history, and human illness in the household. For production animals, add herd size, recent introductions, biosecurity practices, and wildlife sightings on the premises. These fields allow records to be queried across practices and regions, and they provide the exposure data needed when a human case is investigated CDC One Health resources.

Laboratory results should be recorded with the specific assay used, the laboratory, and the interpretation criteria, because PCR targets, serological cut-offs, and culture methods vary between laboratories. A positive result on one platform may not be comparable to a positive result on another, and this variation complicates multi-site surveillance. Standardized reporting to reference laboratories and national databases reduces this problem, but the clinician must document the assay details to make the data usable.

Coordinated Response Protocols

When integrated surveillance identifies a potential zoonotic cluster, the response follows a defined sequence. The first step is verification, which confirms that the cluster is real and not an artefact of changes in testing volume, laboratory methods, or reporting practices. The second step is risk assessment, which determines the potential for human exposure, the severity of the disease, and the likelihood of onward transmission. The third step is notification, which activates the appropriate authorities at the local, regional, or national level depending on the pathogen and the scale of the cluster.

Veterinarians occupy a specific position in this sequence because they are often the first to encounter the animal cases. The decision to notify public health authorities should be made when a zoonotic pathogen is confirmed or strongly suspected, when there is documented human exposure, or when the pattern of animal cases suggests an unusual or emerging event. The notification should include the exposure history, the diagnostic findings, and the contact details for the animal owner or handler, with appropriate consent. The WOAH terrestrial animal health standards provide the international framework for reporting animal disease events that have trade or public health implications WOAH terrestrial animal health code.

Species and Setting Modifications

The correct response varies by species and production system. In companion animal practice, the primary responsibility is to the individual patient and the household, and the response focuses on treatment, prevention of further exposure, and owner education. In production animal practice, the response expands to include herd-level biosecurity, movement restrictions, and reporting to the relevant animal health authority, because the economic and public health consequences of an outbreak are amplified by animal density and trade networks. In wildlife rehabilitation, the response includes quarantine protocols and personal protective equipment for staff, because wildlife can carry pathogens that are not routinely encountered in domestic species Daszak et al. on anthropogenic environmental change and wildlife disease emergence.

The available equipment also changes the diagnostic approach. A practice with in-house PCR capability can provide same-day results for common vector-borne pathogens, while a practice that relies on reference laboratory submission must factor in shipping time and may need to start empirical treatment based on clinical presentation and regional prevalence. Blood smear examination remains valuable in practices without molecular diagnostics, particularly for hemoparasites, but it requires skilled microscopy and has lower sensitivity than PCR for low-level infections.

Case Studies of Integrated Surveillance

The utility of data integration is best demonstrated through documented outbreak responses. The Nipah virus outbreak in Malaysia and Singapore is the most thoroughly analyzed example of agricultural intensification driving zoonotic emergence. The analysis of livestock production data from the index farm showed that the initial viral introduction produced an explosive epizootic that self-extinguished, but it primed the pig population so that reintroduction of the virus produced enzootic persistence Pulliam et al. on agricultural intensification and Nipah virus emergence. This finding refuted the earlier hypothesis that climatic anomalies drove emergence and demonstrated that production system changes, specifically the scale and density of pig farming, were the critical determinants. The lesson for surveillance is that livestock production data, including herd size, turnover, and management changes, are surveillance data and should be monitored alongside clinical case reports.

The ongoing expansion of tick-borne disease in the United States provides a second example. The steady increase in reported cases and the geographic expansion of tick vectors have been documented through integrated surveillance that combines human case reporting, tick collection data, and animal seroprevalence studies Eisen et al. on tick-borne zoonoses in the United States. Dogs have served as sentinels in this system because they are exposed to the same tick habitats as humans and develop disease more rapidly than humans in some cases, providing earlier warning of pathogen circulation. The integration of veterinary diagnostic laboratory data with human surveillance has identified new tick-borne agents and has documented the expansion of established ones.

These cases share a common structure: animal health data contained the earliest signals, the signals were only interpretable when placed in ecological and production context, and the response required coordination across veterinary, medical, and environmental sectors. The same structure applies to the next emerging zoonosis, and the veterinary profession's contribution depends on consistent data collection, standardized reporting, and willingness to share information across institutional boundaries WHO One Health framework.

Recognized Complications and Failure Modes

Integrated surveillance systems fail in predictable patterns. The most common is silent data fragmentation, where veterinary and human health records accumulate in separate platforms that cannot exchange information. This failure is detected only when an outbreak investigation requires manual reconciliation of records from both sectors, a process that typically reveals incompatible case definitions, divergent date formats, and mismatched geographic coding. Routine cross-sector audits of a sample of reported cases, comparing timestamps and location fields, will expose these discrepancies before an emergency.

A second failure mode is signal dilution. When surveillance captures every possible zoonotic event without prioritization, the volume of alerts overwhelms the analytical capacity of public health units. The result is delayed recognition of genuine clusters. Detection depends on pre-agreed thresholds that distinguish background variation from true aberration. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance on zoonotic disease prioritization emphasizes that surveillance systems must rank pathogens by local transmission potential, clinical severity, and economic impact so that analytical effort concentrates on the events most likely to require intervention.

A third complication is the sentinel blind spot. Companion animals and livestock may not show clinical signs during the early phase of infection with a pathogen that is highly pathogenic in humans. Conversely, animals may seroconvert without ever developing disease, producing serosurveillance data that overstates the true infection pressure on human populations. The review of Bartonella spp. in pets and their effect on human health notes that dogs in particular can serve as sentinels because they develop a disease spectrum similar to humans, but the same review cautions that reservoir competence varies by species and region, so sentinel data must be interpreted against local ecological baselines.

Common Errors in Interpretation

Less experienced clinicians often treat a single animal case as evidence of an emerging outbreak. A single confirmed case of leptospirosis in a dog, for example, may reflect endemic exposure instead of a novel cluster. The corrective action is to compare the case against regional baseline incidence and to request concurrent testing of littermates or co-housed animals before escalating to public health authorities.

A second recurring error is the assumption that absence of human cases excludes zoonotic transmission. Many zoonoses have long incubation periods in humans, and reporting delays can extend for weeks. The review of tick-borne zoonoses in the United States highlights that 40% of the described pathogens were recognized only within the last two decades, meaning that diagnostic panels in both human and veterinary medicine lag behind the actual diversity of circulating agents. Clinicians should therefore maintain a low threshold for submitting samples to reference laboratories when clinical signs are compatible with a zoonotic agent that is not covered by routine panels.

A third error involves overinterpreting wildlife surveillance data. Detection of a pathogen in a wildlife reservoir does not predict spillover into domestic animals or humans. The analysis of Nipah virus emergence in Malaysia demonstrated that repeated viral introduction from wildlife changed infection dynamics within pig populations, but the initial wildlife detection alone would not have predicted the subsequent epizootic. Wildlife data must be combined with domestic animal and human surveillance before conclusions about emergence risk are drawn.

Evidence Limitations and Divergent Expert Opinion

The evidence base for integrated surveillance remains uneven. Most published frameworks derive from high-income settings with established laboratory networks, and their transferability to low-resource or remote regions is uncertain. The World Health Organization One Health initiative acknowledges that implementation varies substantially by region and that no single governance model has demonstrated superiority across all contexts.

Expert opinion diverges on the optimal balance between targeted surveillance of known high-risk pathogens and broad, untargeted metagenomic surveillance. Proponents of targeted surveillance argue that finite resources should concentrate on pathogens with documented emergence potential. Advocates of metagenomic approaches counter that the ecological drivers of zoonotic emergence are so diverse that novel pathogens will continue to appear in unexpected hosts and regions. The World Organization for Animal Health terrestrial animal health standards currently favour a risk-based approach, but the standards explicitly allow member countries to adopt more comprehensive surveillance where resources permit.

A further area of disagreement concerns the role of domestic animals as maintenance hosts. For some pathogens, such as Bartonella henselae, the reservoir role of cats is well established. For others, including several tick-borne agents, the relative contribution of domestic animals versus wildlife to human infection risk remains contested. The review of tick-borne zoonoses identifies this gap as a barrier to effective prevention, because control measures targeting domestic animals may have limited effect if wildlife maintenance cycles predominate.

Referral, Consultation, and Regulatory Reporting

Referral to a specialist or reference laboratory is warranted when a suspected zoonotic agent cannot be identified by routine diagnostic panels, when clinical signs are compatible with a notifiable disease, or when a cluster of cases appears in animals or humans. Veterinary microbiologists and public health veterinarians should be consulted early instead of after diagnostic attempts have failed, because sample handling and transport requirements differ substantially between pathogen groups.

Regulatory reporting obligations vary by jurisdiction and by pathogen. Clinicians must know the notifiable disease list for their region and the specific laboratory that receives specimens for confirmatory testing. The MSD Veterinary Manual professional edition provides species-specific guidance on sample collection and handling, while the American Veterinary Medical Association practice resources include policy positions on zoonotic disease reporting and professional obligations. Where uncertainty exists about whether a condition is reportable, the correct action is to contact the relevant animal health authority before proceeding, because delayed reporting can compromise outbreak response and may carry legal consequences.

Frequently Asked Questions

How Can a Small Practice Participate in One Health Surveillance Without Dedicated Data Infrastructure?

Small practices can contribute meaningfully through structured reporting to existing national and international systems. The World Organization for Animal Health terrestrial code defines notifiable disease reporting obligations that apply regardless of practice size. For non-notifiable conditions, submit de-identified case summaries to regional veterinary diagnostic laboratories or academic surveillance programs. Use standardized clinical terminology in records so that manual extraction remains feasible. A spreadsheet tracking unusual presentations, species, geographic location, and diagnostic findings can support retrospective pattern recognition. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention One Health resources offer practical guidance on prioritizing which observations warrant reporting. The limiting factor is usually consistency instead of technology.

What Are the Minimum Data Elements Needed for a Clinically Useful Zoonotic Disease Report?

A useful report requires five elements: species, signalment, clinical signs with onset date, geographic location, and diagnostic test results. Add exposure history when obtainable, including contact with wildlife, other domestic species, or ill persons. The MSD Veterinary Manual provides species-specific guidance on which clinical presentations raise zoonotic suspicion. Record vaccination status and travel history, as both modify differential diagnosis. For vector-borne diseases, note recent ectoparasite exposure and seasonality. Timestamps matter more than narrative detail. A report that arrives late loses most of its operational value even if clinically complete. If a diagnostic laboratory generated the confirmation, include the laboratory identifier and assay type so that results can be reconciled across human and animal databases.

How Should I Handle a Suspected Zoonosis When the Client Declines Diagnostic Testing?

Explain the dual purpose of testing: individual patient management and population-level surveillance. The WHO One Health framework emphasizes that animal diagnosis often precedes and enables human case recognition. Offer tiered options, starting with the least invasive sample that could yield a definitive answer. If the client still declines, document the refusal explicitly, treat presumptively according to current formularies, and advise on symptom monitoring and transmission precautions. Report the clinical suspicion through passive surveillance channels even without laboratory confirmation. Some jurisdictions permit reporting based on compatible clinical signs during an outbreak. Consult local veterinary authorities for current requirements, as these vary by region and disease. Do not let an ideal diagnostic algorithm prevent partial data capture.

Which Zoonoses Should Prompt Direct Communication with Human Health Authorities?

Prioritize conditions with high case fatality, documented human-to-human transmission, or unusual geographic occurrence. Nipah virus exemplifies all three features and requires immediate cross-sector notification given its broad host range and potential for human transmission, as described in analyzes of its emergence in Malaysia and Singapore. Rabies, highly pathogenic avian influenza, and brucellosis also warrant direct contact. For vector-borne diseases, the threshold depends on local epidemiology. The tick-borne zoonoses review notes that 40% of major tick-borne pathogens in the United States were described within the last two decades, so novel presentations of known agents deserve attention. When uncertain, call the relevant public health authority and describe the case, they can advise on reportability. Document the call, the person contacted, and their response in the medical record.

How Do Surveillance Priorities Differ Between Companion Animal and Production Animal Practice?

Companion animal practice emphasizes sentinel detection because pets share household environments with owners. Dogs serve as particularly valuable sentinels for Bartonella infections because they develop a disease spectrum similar to humans, as documented in the Bartonella species review. Production animal practice emphasizes economically consequential pathogens and foodborne transmission routes. The ecological drivers review notes that animal production practices, including intensification and antimicrobial use, directly shape zoonotic emergence risk. Reporting thresholds differ accordingly. A single companion animal case of a novel pathogen may trigger investigation, whereas production animal surveillance often relies on syndromic thresholds within herds. Both settings should maintain the same documentation standards, but the analytical frameworks and response pathways differ substantially.

What Should I Tell a Client Who Asks Whether Their Family Is at Risk?

Provide specific, actionable guidance based on the suspected pathogen and transmission route. For vector-borne zoonoses, emphasize personal protective measures against arthropod exposure. For directly transmitted agents, explain hygiene practices and wound care. The zoonotic disease etiology review confirms that most human contact with animals is benign, but risk increases with certain exposures. Avoid alarming generalizations. State what is known about the specific disease, what remains uncertain, and which symptoms in family members should prompt medical evaluation. Advise clients to inform their physician about the animal exposure. Offer written materials from reputable sources. If the diagnosis is confirmed, follow up with the client to ensure they received appropriate guidance and to capture any human illness that may have occurred, as this information strengthens the surveillance record.

Related Clinical & Scientific Guides

• Wildlife Disease Surveillance: Designing and Implementing a One Health Program
• Biosecurity Risk Assessment for Livestock Operations: A Practical Framework
• Rabies Post-Exposure Prophylaxis in Veterinary Personnel

References and Further Reading

• Ecology of zoonoses: natural and unnatural histories.. 2012.
• Zoonotic Diseases: Etiology, Impact, and Control.. 2020.
• Anthropogenic environmental change and the emergence of infectious diseases in wildlife.. 2001.
• Bartonella spp. in pets and effect on human health.. 2006.
• Tick-Borne Zoonoses in the United States: Persistent and Emerging Threats to Human Health.. 2017.
• Agricultural intensification, priming for persistence and the emergence of Nipah virus: a lethal bat-borne zoonosis.. 2012.
• WHO One Health Initiative. WHO.
• CDC One Health and Zoonotic Disease Resources. CDC.
• MSD Veterinary Manual, Professional Edition. MSD Veterinary Manual.

Related Articles

• One Health Approach to Antimicrobial Resistance: A Veterinary Perspective
• One Health Surveillance Data Integration: Challenges and Solutions
• Foodborne Zoonoses: Comparative Pathogenesis and Clinical Manifestations in Animals and Humans
• Veterinary Public Health and Food Safety: A Systems Approach
• Veterinary Public Health and Climate Change: Impact on Zoonoses

This article is educational professional reference material for veterinary audiences. It is not a substitute for veterinary diagnosis, individual clinical judgment, current product labeling, or applicable regulatory requirements.